We propose a formal model for distributed systems, where each participant advertises its requirements and obligations as behavioural contracts, and where multiparty sessions are started when a set of contracts allows to synthesise a choreography. Our framework is based on the CO 2 calculus for contract-oriented computing, and borrows concepts and results from the session type literature.
Introduction
Distributed applications are nowadays omnipresent but even for seemingly simple cases, there is still a pressing need to make sure they do work as their designers intended. Indeed, such systems are difficult to design, verify, implement, deploy, and maintain. Besides the intrinsic issues due to the underlying execution model (concurrency, physical distribution, etc.), applications have to be designed within a strange paradox: they are made of components that, on the one hand, collaborate with each other and, on the other hand, may compete for resources, or for achieving conflicting goals. This paradox is especially relevant in inter-organisational service-oriented scenarios, where services may be deployed by different entities: even under common policies, the implementations may reflect diverging and changing requirements, up to the point of departing from the agreed specifications. This issue is reflected in standards such as [15] , which includes runtime monitoring and logging to check that interactions in SOAs actually adhere to agreed policies and service descriptions.
Along the lines of [5, 4] , we propose a formal model for distributed systems where contracts drive interactions: components advertise behavioural contracts; such contracts are used at runtime to establish multiparty agreements, and such agreements steer the behaviour of components. Therefore, contracts are not just a specification or a design mechanism anymore, rather they become a pivotal element of the execution model.
In this work, we combine two approaches: session types [11] and contract-oriented computing [5] . From the former, we adopt concepts, syntax and semantics -and in particular, the interplay between local behaviours and choreographies (i.e., between local types and global types) as a method for specifying and analysing the interactions of participants in a distributed system. However, in our framework we do not assume that a participant will necessarily always adhere to its specification, nor that a global description is available beforehand to validate the system. From the contract-oriented computing approach, we adopt CO 2 [4] , a generic contract-oriented calculus where participants advertise their requirements and obligations through contracts, and interact with each other once compliant contracts have been found. Here, we tailor CO 2 to a multiparty model where contracts have the syntax of local types. We say that contracts c 1 , . . . , c n are compliant when, roughly, they can be used to synthesise a choreography -i.e., a global type whose projections are c 1 , . . . , c n themselves [14] . Once a set of compliant contracts has been found, a CO 2 session may be established, wherein the participants who advertised the contracts can interact. However, in line with what may happen in real life scenarios, the runtime behaviour of these participants may then depart from the contracts: the calculus allows to model these situations, and reason about them.
Contributions
Our framework models multiparty contractual agreements as "tangible" objects, i.e., choreographies. This allows us to rely on results and properties from the session type literature -in particular, the well-formedness of a choreography ensures that contractual agreements enjoy knowledge of choice, error/deadlock freedom, and progress. Furthermore, it allows us to easily check that some meta-level properties are satisfied at runtime, e.g., on the number of involved participants, whether or not the session may terminate, etc.
Our adaptation of CO 2 to a multiparty, choreography-based contract model preserves the properties of the original calculus. In particular, if a system gets stuck, it is possible to identify which participants violated their contracts.
We also discuss how the properties of a well-formed choreography are reflected in a context where participants can misbehave. We introduce global progress and session fidelity in CO 2 , again inspired by analogous concepts in theories based on session types. We show that they hold in systems where all participants are honest (i.e., they always respect their contracts in any context) -even when a participant takes part in multiple sessions.
Synopsis. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the rest of this section, we introduce an example that we use to motivate and illustrate our framework. In Section 2, we introduce a multiparty contract model based on choreography synthesis. In Section 3, we present our version of CO 2 and highlight its main features. In Section 4, we define the notion of honesty and its practical importance in our contract-oriented scenario. In Section 5, we present our results, which link the notion of honesty to the progress and safety of a CO 2 system (due to lack of space, the proofs are relegated to an online appendix [13] ). Finally, we discuss related work and conclude in Section 6.
A motivating example
In this section, we introduce a running example to illustrate our framework. We use A, B, . . . for participant names, and a, a , b, . . . for participant variables, and use the colour blue to highlight contracts.
Consider the following distributed scenario: an online store A allows two buyers b 1 and b 2 to make a joint purchase through a simplified protocol: after they both request the same item, a quote is sent to b 1 , who is then expected to either place an order (order) or end the session (bye); the store also promises to notify b 2 about whether the order was placed (ok) or cancelled (bye). A's behaviour is described by the following contract:
What kind of contracts would be compliant with c A ? One answer consists in the following contracts, advertised by buyers B 1 and B 2 .
c B 1 = a!req; a?quote; b 2 !ok; a!order ⊕ b 2 !bye; a!bye c B 2 = a !req; b 1 ?ok; a ?ok + b 1 ?bye; a ?bye Here, B 1 promises to send the request to the store (a), wait for the quote, and then notify the other buyer (b 2 ) before accepting or rejecting the store offer; symmetrically, B 2 's contract sends the request to the store (a ), and then expects to receive the same notification (either ok or bye) from both the other buyer (b 1 ) and the store itself. Each contract represents the local viewpoint of the participant who advertises it: c A represents the local viewpoint of the store, and thus it does not (and indeed, it cannot) capture the communications between B 1 and B 2 .
An agreement among c A , c B 1 and c B 2 may be found by replacing the participant variables in each contract with actual names, e.g., with substitutions { A /a,a }, { B 1/b 1 ,b 1 } and { B 2/b 2 ,b 2 }. Such an agreement is based on the existence of the following choreography (i.e., global type), which can be synthesised similarly to what is done in [14] :
The ability to synthesise G AB 1 B 2 guarantees that the global type is well-formed and projectable back to the initial contracts c A , c B 1 and c B 2 (with the substitutions above); this, in turn, guarantees progress and safety [14] of the contractual agreement. However, in a realistic scenario, the existence of a contractual agreement among participants does not guarantee that progress and safety will also hold at runtime: in fact, a participant may advertise a contract promising some behaviour, and then fail to respect it -either maliciously or accidentally. Such failure may then cascade on other participants, e.g., if they remain stuck waiting for a promised message that is never sent.
This sort of situations can be modelled using the CO 2 calculus. A CO 2 system for the store-and-twocustomers example may be implemented as follows:
Here, participant A advertises its contract c A to itself via the primitive tell A ↓ x c A , where x is used as a session handle for interacting with other participants. B 1 and B 2 advertise their respective contracts to A with a similar invocation.
In this example, A also plays the role of contract broker: once all contracts have been advertised, the fuse prefix can establish a new session, based on the fact that the global agreement G AB 1 B 2 can be synthesised from c A , c B 1 and c B 2 . This new session is shared among participants A, B 1 and B 2 .
At this point, the execution of the system (i.e., the continuation of processes P A , P B 1 and P B 2 ) is not required to respect the contracts. In fact, we will see that when the contracts are violated, the calculus allows for culpable participants to be always ruled out. Furthermore, we will discuss honesty, i.e., the guarantee that a participant will always fulfil its advertised contracts -even in contexts where other participants fail to fulfil theirs. When such a guarantee holds, the contractual progress and safety are also reflected in the runtime behaviour of the CO 2 system. 
where the fuse prefix can now create a session involving A and B 12 .
The participants in the CO 2 systems S 1 and S 2 may also be combined, so to obtain:
In this case, after all contracts have been advertised to A, either a session corresponding to G AB 1 B 2 , or to G AB 12 may take place, thus involving a different number of participants depending on which contracts are fused. In such cases, it makes sense to consider whether one of the agreements should take precedence over the other, and which criteria should drive this choice.
A Choreography-Based Contract Model
We introduce a contract model based on concepts and results from the session types literature. Individual contracts are expressed using the syntax of local session types; while contractual compliance is based on global types synthesis: a set of contracts is compliant if it is possible to synthesise a choreography from it, as described in [14] . For simplicity, we adopt syntax and semantics in the style of [8, 10] : we use participant names (instead of channels) for message exchange, i.e., we consider systems with just one channel between each pair of participants.
Syntax & Semantics. Let P and P be disjoint sets of, respectively, participant names (ranged over by A, B, . . .) and participant variables (ranged over by a, b, . . .). Let a, b range over P ∪ P. The syntax of contracts below is parametrised wrt sorts (ranged over by e) which abstract data types (either simple or complex). We use the colour blue for single contracts and green for systems of contracts.
A contract c may be either: (i) an internal choice ⊕, with the intuitive semantics that after sending the message e i to participant a i , behaviour c i take places; (ii) an external choice ∑, saying that if a message of sort e i is received from a, then behaviour c i takes place; or (iii) a recursive behaviour. We assume that ∀i = j ∈ I : (a i , e i ) = (a j , e j ) in internal choices, ∀i = j ∈ I : e i = e j in external choices, and that ⊕ and + are associative and commutative. We write fv(c) for the free participant variables in c.
A system of contracts T may be either: (i) a parallel composition of systems T | T ; or (ii) a named contract A c , saying that participant A promises to behave according to c; (iii) a queue (AB) : ρ of messages from A to B. In a system T , we assume that there is at most one queue per pair of participants, (i.e., one channel per direction), and that participant names are pairwise distinct.
We consider systems of contracts as processes whose semantics is given by the following main reduction rules (see the online appendix [13] for the omitted ones):
The first rule says that, after an internal choice, participant A puts a message e on its queue for participant B. The second rule says that A's external choice can receive a message of the right sort from an input queue BA. We write T Example 2.1. From the example in Section 1.2, consider the instantiated contracts of the store A and its customer B 12 . We illustrate the initial system, and how it progresses: 
Choreography Synthesis as Compliance. We briefly introduce the compliance relation that tells whether some contracts can be combined to describe a correct interaction. We reuse the main results from [14] : a typing system which assigns a (unique) global type to a set of local types. We say that a set of contracts (i.e., local types) is compliant if it can be assigned a choreography, i.e., a global type. For simplicity, we use only a subset of the global types originally supported (we conjecture that extending this would not pose any difficulties). The main difference is that, in the style of [8, 10] , we replace channels with participant names.
The syntax of global types is as follows:
where the first production means that a participant A sends a message of sort e to B, then interactions in G take place; G + G means that either interactions in G , or in G take place; G | G means that interactions in G and G are executed concurrently; the rest of the productions are for recursive interactions, and end. Similarly to the original synthesis, we use judgements of the form Γ T G , where Γ is an environment to keep track of recursion variables, T is a system of contracts, and G is the global type assigned to T . We say that a system of contracts T has global type G , if one can infer the judgement • T G from the rules in the online appendix [13] (simplified from [14] ) where • is the empty context Γ. Essentially, the synthesis rules allow to execute a set of contracts step-by-step, while keeping track of the structure of the interactions in a global type.
The main properties that we are interested in -and that are guaranteed by the synthesis -is that the inferred global type is (i) well-formed, and (ii) projectable back to the original contracts. Essentially, this means that each local type must be single-threaded, and that knowledge of choice is preserved -i.e., each choice is made by exactly one participant, and all the others are either made aware of the choice, or they have the same behaviour whatever choice is made. Example 2.2. Building up on the example from Section 1.2, we combine the contract of store A with those of customers B 1 and B 2 , and we obtain the system: which can be assigned the following global type:
that is to say that • T AB 1 B 2 G AB 1 B 2 holds. Instead, if we combine the store A with B 12 we have 
A Multiparty Version of CO 2
We introduce a version of the CO 2 calculus (for COntract-Oriented computing) [4] adapted to multiparty contracts and sessions. Let S and S be disjoint sets of, respectively, session names (ranged over by s, s , . . .) and session variables (ranged over by x, y, z . . .). Let u, v, . . . range over S ∪ S .
Syntax & Semantics. The syntax of CO 2 is given by the following productions:
CO 2 features CCS-style processes, equipped with branching ∑ (not to be confused with the choice operator used in contracts), parallel composition |, restrictions of session and participant variables, and named process invocation. The prefixes are for internal action (τ), contract advertisement (tell↓), session creation upon contractual agreement (fuse), and execution of contractual actions (do). A latent contract of the form ↓ u A says c represents the promise of participant A to fulfil c by executing do-actions on a session variable u. CO 2 systems may be parallel compositions of processes A[P] (where A is the participant executing P), latent contracts A[K] (where A is the participant to which the contracts in K have been advertised), and established sessions s[T ] (where s is a session name, and T is a system of stipulated contracts as in Section 2). We assume well-formed systems where each participant A has at most one process A[P]. Note that CO 2 process and system productions allow to delimit both session names/variables ( u) and participant variables ( a), but not participant names, which are considered public.
We give the main reduction rules for the semantics of CO 2 (where + and | are standard associative and commutative operators):
[CO 2 -TELL] allows a participant A to advertise a contract c to B; as a result, a new latent contract is created, recording the fact that it was promised by A. [CO 2 -FUSE] establishes a new session: the latent contracts held in A[K] are combined, and their participant variables substituted, in order to find an agreement, i.e., a T which satisfies the relation K σ π T (see Definition 3.2 below). Provided an agreement is found, fresh session variable s and participants names are shared among the parties, via substitutions σ and π; within the session, the involved contracts become stipulated (as opposed to "latent", before the agreement). Rule [CO 2 -DO] allows A to perform an input/output action e towards B on session s, provided that T permits it. The omitted CO 2 rules are standard, and they are listed in the online appendix [13] : they cover internal actions, parametric processes, parallel composition, and delimitations.
When needed, we label CO 2 system transitions: S A : p − − → S means that S reduces to S through a prefix p fired by participant A.
Example 3.1. Consider the CO 2 system:
Here, the CO 2 process of participant A can perform an action towards B on session s, with either a message of sort int or bool. However, A's contract in s only specifies that A should send a message of sort int to B: therefore, according to rule [CO 2 -DO], only the first branch of A may be chosen, and the system reduces as follows.
A main difference between our adaptation of CO 2 and the original presentation comes from the way we specify session establishment. We adopt the session agreement relation defined below.
A i = A j , and let π : P → P and σ : S → S be two substitutions mapping participant variables to names, and session variables to names, respectively. Also, let T ≡ i∈I A i c i π. We define:
Intuitively, a system of stipulated contracts T is constructed from a set of latent contracts K, using a substitution π that maps all the participant variables in K to the participant names in K itself. If it is possible to synthesise a global type G out of T , then the relation holds, and a contractual agreement exists. The first two conditions, on σ and π, guarantee that all the session and participant variables are indeed instantiated. The third condition ensures that within a contract c i , belonging to A i , no free participant variable in c i is substituted by A i itself. Note that due to the condition imposed on K, each participant may have at most one contract per session. Example 3.3. We now illustrate how Definition 3.2 works. Consider the following CO 2 system, with A, B 1 , B 2 from Section 1.2, and T AB 1 B 2 from Example 2.2:
The initial system S 1 is the one considered in Section 1.2, where all the participants are ready to advertise their respective contracts to the store A, by using a tell A ↓-primitive. This has the effect of creating corresponding latent contracts within A. Once all the latent contracts are in a same location, they may be fused. In this case, given σ and π as above, Definition 3.2 is indeed applicable: the domains of σ and π comply with the definition's premises, and we already saw that a system consisting of c A , c B 1 and c B 2 may be assigned a global type. Hence, a new session s is created, based on the system of contracts T AB 1 B 2 , plus the queues connecting all pairs of participants. The session variables of the latent contracts being fused (i.e., x for participant A, y for B 1 , and z for B 2 ) are all substituted with the fresh session name s in the processes P A , P B 1 and P B 2 , via σ . Similarly for participant variables which are substituted with participant names, via π.
The CO 2 semantic rules are to be considered up-to a standard structural congruence relation ≡ (cf. 
The fuse prefix cannot be fired: no contract matches A 3 's, and thus the three latent contracts cannot be assigned a global type. However, by rearranging the system with congruence ≡, we have:
It is now possible to synthesise a global type A 1 → A 2 : int, and a session may be created for A 1 and A 2 . A 3 's latent contract may be fused later on.
Flexibility of Session Establishment
We highlight the flexibility of our definition of contract agreement, together with the semantics of CO 2 , by discussing three features: (i) contracts may use a mix of participant names and variables, (ii) different contracts may use common participant variables, and (iii) the definition of agreement may be easily extended.
Contracts with both participant names and variables.
A may want to sell an item to a specific participant B, via any shipping company that provides a package tracking system. A's contract may be: B!price; B?ack; a!request; a?tracking; B!tracking saying that the seller A must send a price to the buyer B; once B has acknowledged, A must send a shipping request to a shipper a -who must send back a tracking number, which is then forwarded to B. This contract may be fused only if B takes part in the session, while the role of shipper a may be played by any participant.
Contracts sharing participant variables. Consider the CO 2 process:
Here, A advertises two contracts: the first one (b!request) is used by A to find a shipping company, and the second (b !quote; . . . b!address) to sell items. The two contracts are linked by the common variable b: whenever the first one is fused, variable b is instantiated to a participant name, say B, which is also substituted in the second. This means that whenever a new selling session starts, B will also be involved as the receiver of the address message.
Possible extensions. The participants firing fuse-primitives are playing the role of brokers in our framework. Depending on their implementation, brokers may also have some obligations in the contracts they fuse, or they may want to enforce some general policy -therefore they may have additional requirements before agreeing to start a session. For instance, a broker may not want to start a session with too many participants as it may be too resource demanding (too many connections etc.). Another broker may want to start sessions that terminates after a limited number of interactions, because it has a short life expectancy, e.g., due to an approaching scheduled maintenance. Another kind of broker may precisely want to start sessions which do not terminate, e.g., if the broker is interested in resilient services.
Several variations of the fuse primitive are possible thanks to the fact that we base contract agreements on objects representing the overall choreography. We introduce fuse[n], a version of fuse that only fuses sessions where there are at least n participants; fuse T , which has the additional constraint that no recursive behaviour is allowed in the synthesised choreography (therefore ensuring that the session will eventually terminate), and fuse R , which only creates sessions when the synthesised choreography never terminates (i.e., it only consists of recursive behaviours).
The three extensions may be defined directly via small modifications of Definition 3.2:
• fuse[n]: we add the condition |P(G )| ≥ n, where P(G ) is the set of participants in G ;
• fuse T : we add the condition that there should not be any recursion variable x in G ;
• fuse R : we add the condition that 0 does not appear in G .
This kind of properties must be checked for at global level because it cannot always be decided by looking at the individual contracts. For instance, a participant might exhibit a recursive behaviour in one of the branches of an external choice, while the participant it interacts with may always choose a branch that is not recursive. Note that none of these variations actually affect the results that follow, since the original fuse primitive is also blocking. The variations only restrict some of its applications. Further variations of fuse are sketched in Section 6, as future work.
The Problem of Honesty
In this section, we discuss and define the notion of honesty [4] , i.e., the ability of a participant to always fulfil its contracts, in any context. Broadly speaking, in our contract-oriented setting, honesty is the counterpart of well-typedness in a session type setting: the static proof that a participant always honours its contracts provides guarantees about its runtime behaviour. As seen in Example 3.1, each do prefix within the process of a participant, say A[P], is driven by the contract that A promised to abide by. In a sense, CO 2 is culpability-driven, according to Definition 4.1 below: when a participant is culpable, it has the duty of making the session progress according to its contract. A culpable participant can overcome its status by firing its do prefixes, according to [CO 2 -DO], until another participant becomes culpable or session s terminates. Hence, as long as a culpable participant A does not enable a do-prefix matching a contractual action, A will remain culpable. Note that when a participant is involved in multiple sessions, it may result culpable in more than one of them.
When a participant A is always able to fulfil its contractual actions (i.e., overcome its culpability), no matter what other participants do, then it is said to be honest (cf. Definition 4.9). This is a desirable property in a distributed contract-oriented scenario: a participant may be stuck in a culpable condition either due to "simple" bugs (cf. Example 4.7), or due to the unexpected (or malicious) behaviour of other participants (cf. Example 5.6). Therefore, before deploying a service, its developers might want to ensure that it will always be able exculpate itself.
Formally, as in [1] , we base the definition of honesty on the relationship between the ready sets of a contract, and those of a CO 2 process. We call the former contract ready sets, and the latter process ready sets. The concept of contract ready sets is similar to [9, 4, 1] , where only bilateral contracts are considered. Here, we adapt it to suit our multiparty contract model. 
Intuitively, when a participant A is bound to a contract c, the ready sets of c tell which interactions A must be able to perform towards other participants. Each interaction has the form of a pair, consisting of a participant name and a message sort. The interactions offered by an external choice are all available at once, while those offered by an internal choice are mutually exclusive. We have CRS(c A ) = {{(B 1 , req)}}: in other words, at this point of the contract, an interaction is expected between A and B 1 (since A is waiting for req), while no interaction is expected between A and B 2 .
Let us now equip T AB 1 B 2 with one queue between each pair of participants, and let it perform the request exchange between B 1 and A, with the transitions:
We have thatc A in T AB 1 B 2 is now reduced to: c A = B 2 ?req; B 1 !quote; (B 1 ?order; B 2 !ok + B 1 ?bye; B 2 !bye) and thus we have CRS(c A ) = {{(B 2 , req)}}, i.e., A is now waiting for a request from B 2 .
If we let the system reduce further,c A reaches its external choice:
Now, the ready sets become CRS(c A ) = {{(B 1 , order), (B 1 , bye)}}, i.e., A must handle both answers from B 1 . Instead, whenc B 1 reduces to its internal choice, we have:
Thus, its ready sets become CRS(c B 1 ) = {{(B 2 , ok)} , {(B 2 , bye)}}: B 1 is free to choose either branch.
Example 4.3 shows that, when a contract c of a principal A evolves within a system T , its ready sets change. Now we need to define the counterpart of contract ready sets for CO 2 processes, i.e., the process ready sets. Again, we adapt the definition from [1] to our multiparty contract model. 
Intuitively, Definition 4.4 says that the process ready set of A over a session u in a system S contains the interactions that A is immediately able to perform with other participants through its do u prefixes. Just as in contract ready sets, the interactions are represented by participant/sort pairs.
Next, we want to characterise a weaker notion of the process ready set, so it only takes into account the first actions on a specific session that a participant is ready to make. −−−−−→ S iff:
We then define the set of pairs WPRS u A (S) as:
In Definition 4.5, we are not interested in the actions that do not relate to the session u. Thus, we allow the system to evolve either by (i) letting any other participant other than A do an action, or (ii) letting A act on a different session than u, or (iii) do internal actions.
We now introduce the final ingredient for honesty, that is the notion of readiness of a participant. ∃X ∈ CRS(c) : ((B, e) ∈ X =⇒ (B, e) ∈ WPRS s A (S 1 )) Definition 4.6 says that a participant A is ready in a system S whenever its process ready sets for a session s will eventually contain all the participant/sort pairs of one of the contract ready sets of A's contract in s. When a participant A is "ready", then, for any of its contracts c, the CO 2 process of A is (eventually) able to fulfil at least the interactions in c's prefix. Example 4.7. We have seen that, after fusion of the latent contracts of S 1 (in Ex. 3.3) we obtain:
where the substitutions σ and π are also from Ex. 3.3. Let us define the processes (after substitutions):
Note that the τ prefix in P B 1 prevents B 1 from interacting immediately with A on session s, although it is "weakly ready" to do it. Hence, considering that the weak process ready sets of each participant in S 1 match their respective contract ready sets in T AB 1 B 2 (Example 4.3) according to Definition 4.6 we have that participants A, B 1 and B 2 are all ready in (s)S 1 .
Before defining honesty formally, we need to characterise the class of systems for which this concept is meaningful, i.e., those systems where a participant is not (yet) involved in latent contracts nor active sessions. Definition 4.8 (Initial System). A CO 2 system S is A-initial if S has no sub-term of the form ↓ A says c or A c with c ≡ 0. A CO 2 system S is initial when it is A-initial for each participant A in S. Definition 4.9 (Honesty). We say that
is ready in S .
A process A[P] is said to be honest when, for all contexts and reductions that A[P] may be engaged in, A is persistently ready. In other words, there is a continuous correspondence between the interactions exposed in the contract ready sets and the process ready sets of the possible reductions of any system involving A [P] . The definition rules out contexts with latent/stipulated contracts of A, otherwise A could be made trivially dishonest, e.g. by inserting a latent contract ↓ u A says c that A cannot fulfil. 
At this point, we see that there is a problem in the implementation of B 1 : it does not notify the other buyer before making an order. In fact, B 1 's process is trying to perform do s A order, but its contract requires that do s B 2 ok is performed first (or do s B 2 bye, if the quote is rejected). This is reflected by the mismatch between B 1 's process ready set in S 1 , and its contract ready sets, in session s: As in [1] , the definition of honesty subsumes a fair scheduler, eventually allowing participants to fire persistently (weakly) enabled do actions.
Honesty is not decidable in general [4] , but for a bilateral contract model it has been approximated either via an abstract semantics [4] or a type discipline [1] for CO 2 . We believe that these approximations may be easily adapted to our setting (see Section 6 for more details).
Results
We now give the main properties of our framework. We ensure that two basic features of CO 2 hold in our multiparty adaptation: the state of a session always allows to establish who is responsible for making the system progress (Th. 5.1) and honest participants can always exculpate themselves (Th. 5.3). We then formalise a link between the honesty of participants, and two key properties borrowed from the session types setting: Th. 5.4 introduces session fidelity in CO 2 ; and Th. 5.5 introduces a notion of progress in CO 2 , based on the progress of the contractual agreement (and its choreography). Theorem 5.4 says that each (honest) participant will strictly adhere to its contracts, once they have been fused in a session. It follows directly from the semantics of CO 2 (that forbid non-contractual do prefixes to be fired) and from the definition of honesty.
Theorem 5.5 below introduces the notion of global progress, which is slightly different from the contractual progress. In fact, progress in CO 2 is only meaningful after a session has been established, and thus a culpable participant exists. A system without sessions may not progress because a set of compliant contracts cannot be found, or a fuse prefix is not enabled. In both cases, no participant may be deemed culpable, and thus responsible for the next move. However, the system may progress again if other (honest) participants join it, allowing a session to be established. Theorem 5.5 follows from the definition of honesty (i.e., participants are always ready to fulfil their contracts), the fact that contract compliance guarantees contractual progress [14] , Theorem 5.3, and the semantics of CO 2 (in particular, rule [CO 2 -DO]). This result also holds for systems where a process takes part in multiple sessions: the honesty of all participants guarantees that all sessions will be completed.
Example 5.6. We now give a simple example on a system with multiple sessions. We show how a seemingly honest process (B) could be deemed culpable due to the unexpected behaviour of other participants, and how honest participants guarantee progress of the whole system. Consider:
After all four contracts have been advertised to A and fused, the system reduces to:
Even if both sessions s 1 and s 2 enjoy contractual progress, S is stuck: A does not perform the promised action, thus remaining culpable in s 1 ; B is stuck waiting in s 1 , thus remaining culpable in s 2 . 2 Indeed, neither A nor B are ready in S , and thus they are not honest in S. Hence, global progress is not guaranteed. Let us now consider the following variant of S, where all participants are honest:
In this case, A will respect its contractual duties, while B will be ready to fulfil its contracts on both sessions -even if one is not activated, or remains stuck (here, τ represents an internal action, e.g., a timeout: if the first do y A int cannot reduce, B falls back to running the sessions in parallel). The honesty of all participants inŜ guarantees that, once a session is active, it will reach its completion.
Concluding remarks
In this work, we investigated the combination of the contract-oriented calculus CO 2 with a contract model that fulfils two basic design requirements: (i) it supports multiparty agreements, and (ii) it provides an explicit description of the choreography that embodies each agreement. These requirements prompted us towards the well-established results from the session types setting -in particular, regarding the interplay between a well-formed global type and its corresponding local behaviours. We introduced the concepts of global progress and session fidelity in CO 2 , also inspired from the analogous concepts in theories based on session types. We built our framework upon a simple version of session types, and yet it turns out to be quite flexible, allowing for sessions where the number of participants is not known beforehand.
Related work. The origin of CO 2 goes back to [5] . The calculus was generalised in [2, 3] to suit different contract models (e.g., contracts as processes or logic formulae). In [4] , it has been instantiated to a theory of bilateral contracts inspired by [9] . A negative result in [4] is that the problem of honesty (Section 4) is not decidable. A type system for CO 2 processes providing a decidable approximation of honesty was introduced in [1] . This result relies on the product between a finite state system (approximating contracts) and a Basic Parallel Process (approximating a CO 2 process). Considering that the systems of contracts in this work form a (strict) subset of the local/global types in [10] , for which each configuration is reachable by a 1-buffer execution, we believe that the type system in [1] may be adapted to our setting.
The seminal top-down approach of multiparty session types has been first described in [11] . In summary, the framework works as follows: designers specify a choreography (i.e., a global type), which is then projected onto local behaviours (i.e., local types), which in turn are used to type-check processes. A dual approach was introduced in [14] : from a set of local types it is possible to synthesise a choreography (i.e., a global type). This is precisely the result we use as a basis for our definition of compliant contracts.
The semantic correspondence between global types and projected local behaviours has been investigated in [12, 8] . To the best of our knowledge, no other contract model besides ours is based on explicit choreography synthesis. A related approach is presented in [7] : multiple contracts are considered compliant when their composition (i.e., the system of contracts) guarantees completion. In our work, progress (subsuming completion) is provided by the synthesis of a global type. In [6] , contracts are considered compliant when their composition adheres to a predetermined choreography; in our framework, however, no choreography is assumed beforehand.
Future work. We plan to extend our work so to offer even more flexibility. For example, by introducing a parameterised fuse primitive which starts a session according to different criteria, when more than one agreement is possible (as in our introductory example). For instance, one could choose the agreement involving the most (or least) number of participants. These criteria may be based on a semantic characterisation of global types, e.g., as the ones in [12, 8] . We also plan to study the possibility for a participant to be involved in a session under multiple contracts, e.g., a bank advertising two services, and a customer publishing a contract which uses both of them in a well-formed choreography.
Another research direction is the concept of "group honesty". In fact, the current definition of honesty is quite strict: it basically verifies each participant in isolation, thus providing a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for progress. Consider, for example, a CO 2 system like: S = (x, y) A[tell A ↓ x (B!int ⊕ B!bool) . fuse . do B is dishonest, since it is not ready for the bool branch of its contract. However, the system S has progress: when B establishes a session with A, the latter will never take the bool branch; hence, B will not remain culpable. This kind of "group honesty" may be used to validate (sub-)systems of participants developed by the same organization: it would ensure that they never "cheat each other", and are collectively honest when deployed in any context. Furthermore, the group honesty of all participants in a system S may turn out to be a necessary condition for the global progress of S.
